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Beck v. PACE International Union: A Mask of Unanimity to
Conceal Disagreement and Confusion

By Sharon Hritz*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When and how much deference should courts give to an agency's
interpretation of its own enabling statutes? Does the form of the
agency opinion-whether it is embodied in notice and comment
rulemaking, an opinion letter, a brief or other form-affect the level
of deference owed?
Can an attorney, Article III Judge, or
Administrative Law Judge determine with certainty the appropriate
level of deference to be given and then apply that level of review
clearly and consistently to determine if the agency's interpretation
should ultimately prevail? These broad questions have surfaced
repeatedly in many of the various substantive areas of administrative
law and merit close attention.
Controversy surrounding the appropriate level of judicial
deference to an agency's interpretation of its own enabling statutes is
not a recent phenomenon. In fact, the two most commonly cited
cases in this area of the law-Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.-were
decided in 1944 and 1984, respectively.1 However, these enduring
landmark cases and the numerous cases that applied them have failed
to provide concrete guidance. The ambiguity in this area of the law
was recently exemplified in Beck v. Pace InternationalUnion, which
the Supreme Court of the United States handed down in June 2007.2

• J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007).
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The Court's decision in Beck is one of its most recent cases
confronting the issue of applying judicial deference to agency
interpretations. The deference question arose over the backdrop of
an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) fiduciary
duty controversy. 3 While the controversy originated between a
private company and an employee union, the Court's decision relied
entirely on the position of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC).4 The Court's deference to PBGC's interpretation illustrates
an expansion of the application of judicial deference, which
potentially includes agency positions presented for the first time in
litigation.
Beck is noteworthy for holding that sponsors of defined-benefit
pension plans do not have a fiduciary duty to consider mergers when
implementing plan termination. 5 Although the Beck opinion was
unanimous, its legal analysis and the Court's deference to an agency
interpretation, expressed for the first time in litigation, merit close
attention and analysis. 6 The Court's holding in Beck addresses two
distinct areas of law, each with its own legal history and impact on
the law and society. First, the Beck opinion has a significant impact
on deference jurisprudence. Second, Beck clarifies an important
point in ERISA fiduciary law.
This case note examines the deference and fiduciary duty issues
raised by the Beck opinion. Part II illustrates the legal history of both
the fiduciary and deference issues set forth in the case. 7 Part III
details the facts and procedural history of Beck. 8 Part IV examines
and critiques the Court's decision in Beck.9 Part V analyzes the legal

3. Id.
4. Id. For a description of the PBGC, see infra Part 1I and accompanying notes.
The PBGC became involved in the controversy as amicus curiae at the district
court level, expressing its interpretation of the statutory text being debated. Beck v.
PACE Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310, 2310 (2007).
5. Id. at 2310.
6. See id.
7. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
8. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
9. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
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significance of Beck l° , and Part VI considers the societal impact of
the case. 1 Finally Part VII concludes this note. 2
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. ERISA and Imposition of the FiduciaryDuty
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA to "protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries." 13 Pursuant to this goal, ERISA established
an insurance program for private pension plans.14 This insurance
program is administered by the PBGC, a "body corporate" within the
Department of Labor. 15
ERISA requires retirement plan administrators to act as
fiduciaries of plan participants. 16 The fiduciary duty is commonly
referred to as "the highest [duty] known to the law"'1 7 and is formally
defined as "a duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor
10. See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
11. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes.
12. See infra Part VII and accompanying notes.
13. 29 U.S.C. §1001(b). ERISA accomplishes its goal to protect the interests
of participants in employee benefit plans by: "requiring the disclosure and
reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation
for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." Id.
14. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1322 cmt. 1.
15. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., http://pbgc.gov/about/about.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2008). The PBGC is headed by a Director who reports to a Board
of Directors consisting of the Secretaries of Labor, Commerce, and Treasury, with
the Secretary of Labor as Chairman. Rather than operate on tax funds, the PBGC
operates on insurance premiums from employers sponsoring insured pension plans,
investment returns, and funds from pensions it takes over. Id.
16. See generally 29 U.S.C. §1001. ERISA defines plan "administrator" as:
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the
instrument under which the plan is operated; (ii) if an
administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or (iii) in the
case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a
plan sponsor cannot be identified, such other person as the
Secretary may by regulation prescribe.
Id. at § 1002(16)(A) (2006).
17. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1982).
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. . a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty
toward another person and in the best interests of the other person...
,,18
,
In many instances, controversies have required courts to
determine when ERISA imposes the fiduciary duty. The Court's
determination not only impacts the controversies before them, but
how businesses and managers conduct themselves.
In single-employer pension plans, the employer may act in a dual
capacity as both plan sponsor and plan administrator. 19 This dual
capacity is authorized by ERISA. 2 ° When performing settler
functions, the employer is free to make decisions for the sole purpose
of furthering its business interests, but when acting as plan
administrator in a capacity that ERISA defines as fiduciary, the
*

18. Black's Law Dictionary 545 (8th ed. 2004).
19. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498 (1996). For a definition of the
term "plan administrator," see supra note 16. ERISA defines "plan sponsor" as:
(i) the employer in the case of an employee benefit plan
established or maintained by a single employer, (ii) the employee
organization in the case of a plan established or maintained by an
employee organization, or (iii) in the case of a plan established or
maintained by two or more employers or jointly by one or more
employers and one or more employee organizations, the
association, committee, joint board of trustees, or other similar
group of representatives of the parties who establish or maintain
the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B) (2006). A single employer plan is a plan "which is not a
multi-employer plan." 29 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). A multi-employer plan is defined
as: "A plan (i) to which more than one employer is required to contribute, (ii)
which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining agreements
between one or more employee organizations and more than one employer, and
(iii) which satisfies such other requirements as the Secretary may prescribe by
regulation." 29 U.S.C. § 37 (2006).
20. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1988). The plaintiff-employee in
Lockheed alleged that the respondent-employer violated ERISA's fiduciary
requirements by amending pension plans to create retirement plans. The Court
held that the employer did not violate ERISA because the fiduciary duty did not
apply to the employer's decision to amend the plan. In so holding, the Court
distinguished between settler and fiduciary actions, following the precedent that
established that distinction in the context of welfare administration. Id. See
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995). As the Court
reasoned: "Given ERISA's definition of fiduciary and the applicability of the duties
that attend that status, we think that the rules regarding fiduciary capacityincluding the settler-fiduciary distraction-should apply to pension and welfare
plans alike." Spink, 517 U.S. at 891.
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employer must comply with ERISA's fiduciary duties."
Consequently, when evaluating whether an employer owes a
fiduciary duty, courts must consider if the employer is acting as a
settler or plan administrator. 22
In Curtiss-Wright Corp., the Court established that an employer's

decision to terminate a plan is a settler action and, consequently, is
immune from ERISA's fiduciary obligations.23 The Court has
consistently upheld the principal that employers may terminate their
plans voluntarily, and that a decision terminating a plan is not subject
to ERISA fiduciary standards. 24 Several circuit courts have similarly
held that a decision to merge or consolidate a plan is not a fiduciary
decision, but rather a business decision. 25 However, while a decision
21. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). In this case, the Court held that
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by a health maintenance
organization were not fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA and thus could not
form the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Id. The Court emphasized that
whether or not a defendant acted in a fiduciary capacity is always a precursory
question in an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim:
Thus, in every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty, the
threshold question is not whether the actions of some person
providing services under the plan adversely affected a
beneficiary's interest, but whether that person was performing a
fiduciary function when taking the action subject to complaint..
. . Employers... can be ERISA fiduciaries and still take actions
to the disadvantage of employee beneficiaries when they act as
employers (e.g., firing a beneficiary for reasons unrelated to the
ERISA plan), or even as plan sponsors (e.g., modifying the terms
of a plan as allowed by ERISA to provide less generous
benefits).
Id. at 212, 225.
22. See supra note 15. For a detailed discussion on when the fiduciary duty
applies, see James Lockhart, Annotation, When Is an Employer, Labor Union,
Affiliated Entity or Person, or Pension or Welfare Plan "Fiduciary" Within
Meaning of §3(21)(A)(i) or (iii) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (29 US.C.A. § 1002(21)(A)(i) or (iii)), 178 A.L.R. FED. 129 (2002).
23. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).

24. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990); Lockheed
Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S.
73, 78 (1995).
25. Malia v. General Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
employer's efforts to merge two pension plans did not invoke fiduciary provisions
of ERISA); Sutter v. BASF Corp., 964 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1992) (employer did not
have a duty to credit employees with additional participation in retirement plan
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to merge or terminate a plan is a non-fiduciary business decision, the
selection of an insurer or annuity provider in the termination of the
plan is fiduciary. 26
Section 1341(b) of ERISA governs plan termination and states
that the plan administrator shall provide all benefit liabilities under
the plan either through the purchase of an irrevocable commitment
from an insurer or in another manner. 27 The statute fails to

because employer did not adequately inform employees of the consequences of not
contributing after employer merged what had been separate contributory and
noncontributory retirement plans-the merger decision was a business decision).
26. There are several cases where courts have held the selection of an insurer
or annuity provider to underwrite vested benefits to be fiduciary. UAW v. Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that
employer's selection of an insurance company from which to purchase annuity was
fiduciary-choice of insurer was a discretionary decision and separate from the
precursory non-fiduciary decision to terminate); Riley v. Murdock, 890 F. Supp.
444 (E.D.N.C. 1995), aff'd, 83 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision) (held that employer owed a fiduciary duty in selecting an annuity upon
plan termination, but that employer did not breach that duty when the plan he
selected later became insolvent because employer's selection was well-investigated
and reasonable at the time employer purchased the annuity); Waller v. Blue Cross
of Cal., 32 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 1994) (selection of annuity was a fiduciary act).
Additionally, the PBGC made it explicitly clear that companies do act in a
fiduciary capacity in selecting an annuity provider. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1 (2008).
Pursuant to ERISA, section 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1),
fiduciaries must discharge their duties with respect to the plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries ....
The selection of an annuity provider for purposes of a pension
benefit distribution, whether upon separation or retirement of a
participant or upon the termination of a plan, is a fiduciary
decision governed by the provisions of part 4 of Title I of
ERISA. In discharging their obligations under section 404(a)(1),
29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1), to act solely in the interest of participants
and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to the participants and beneficiaries as well as defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan, fiduciaries
choosing an annuity provider for the purpose of making a benefit
distribution must take steps calculated to obtain the safest
annuity available,unless under the circumstances it would be in
the interests of participants and beneficiaries to do otherwise.
Id. at 2509.95-1 (b) (emphasis added).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b) (2006).
In connection with any final distribution of assets pursuant to the
standard termination of the plan . . . the plan administrator
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28
definitively indicate if merger is an acceptable form of termination.
This lack of clarity in the statute led to the controversy in Beck and
the discussion of judicial deference.

B. Deference to Agency Interpretations
When a statute is unclear or susceptible to different
interpretations, the Court gives deference to the pertinent
administrative body's interpretation of the statute as evidenced in the
agencies regulations. 29 How much deference should be given to the
agency's interpretation and what factors should be considered in
making that determination have been debated repeatedly by the
Court.30
1. The Landmark Cases: Skidmore, Chevron and Mead.
Skidmore v. Swift was not the first case to consider judicial
deference to agency interpretations of this agency's own enabling
statutes. Instead, Skidmore serves as a logical place to begin an
analysis of the Court's deference jurisprudence because it established
the first "test" to be used by courts to determine how much deference
was due a particular agency's statutory interpretation. 3' The Court in
Skidmore considered how much deference should be given to an
interpretive bulletin issued by the Department of Labor's Wage and

shall-(i) purchase irrevocable commitments from an insurer to
provide all benefit liabilities under the plan, or (ii) in accordance
with the provisions of the plan and any applicable regulations,
otherwise fully provide all benefit liabilities under the plan. A
transfer of assets to the corporation in accordance with section
1350 of this title on behalf of a missing participant shall satisfy
this subparagraph with respect to such participant.

29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(A) (2006).
28. Id.
29. See Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) ("[A] court that

tries to chart a true course to the Act's purpose embarks on a voyage without a
compass when it disregards the agency's views"). See also Mead v. Tilley, 490
U.S. 714 (1989).
30. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
31. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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Hour Administration. 32 The Court concluded that the bulletin was
not controlling by reason of its authority but did "constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance." 33 Therefore, according to the Court,
the amount of weight given to an agency interpretation depends on
"the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, the
agency's consistency, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking the power to control. 34 The Court remanded the
case to the lower court to decide on the agency's interpretation,
giving the Secretary's opinion its appropriate weight. 35 The Court's
flexible standard in Skidmore contrasts rather dramatically with the
Court's later holding in Chevron, where the Court held that an
agency's interpretation of a statute can be controlling when the
36
statute is ambiguous and the agency's decision is reasonable.
Justice Stevens wrote the unanimous Chevron opinion in 1984. 37
The question in Chevron was whether the Environmental Protection

32. Id. at 140. The plaintiffs in Skidmore were employees of Swift & Co. who
brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, to recover overtime
compensation, damages, and attorney's fees. Id. at 135. The plaintiffs complained
they were required to remain on Swift's premises, in a dormitory provided and
furnished by Swift, three to four nights per week without appropriate
compensation. Id. While the employees performed no regular duties during these
hours, they were "on call" in case a fire alarm sounded. Id. In interpreting the Fair
Labor Standard Act to determine if plaintiffs were owed additional compensation,
the Court considered the views of the agency's Administrator. The Administrator
had set forth his interpretations of various provisions of the Act in "interpretative
bulletin[s] and in informal rulings," designed to provide guidance regarding the law
to both employers and employees. Id. at 137. One such bulletin opined that
inactive duty required a "flexible solution" and suggested guidelines to be followed
by employers, including how the employee uses his time and if he is free to pursue
normal pursuits such as eating and sleeping. Id. at 138. Relying on the
Administrator's bulletin, the lower court categorized the employees' "on call" time
as non-working time. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Administrator's guidelines were not controlling, but should be given weight
according to persuasiveness. Id. at 140.
33. Id. at 140.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
37. Id.
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Agency's (EPA) decision to allow states to treat all pollutionemitting devices in the same industrial group as a single "stationary
source" (referred to as the "bubble" concept) was based on "a
38
reasonable construction of the statutory term 'stationary source."'
The Court found the EPA's interpretation reasonable, overruling the
decision below.3 9 In doing so, the Court established the rule that
when the intent of Congress is "silent or ambiguous with respect to a
specific issue, the [next] question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.",40 This analysis is commonly referred to as the "Chevron
two-step., 4 1 First, the court determines whether Congress has
spoken on the specific question at issue. 4 2 If Congress is silent or
ambiguous, the court then determines if the agency interpretation is
38. Id. at 840. The pertinent portions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1997 require permits for all "new or modified stationary sources" and define a
"stationary source" as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits
or may emit any air pollutant." See 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(3) (2006). Through notice
and comment rulemaking, the EPA further defined the terms "building, structure,
facility, or installation" to mean "all of the pollutant-emitting activities which
belong to the same industrial grouping, are located on one or more contiguous or
adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same person (or persons under
common control) except the activities of any vessel." 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.180)( 1)(i)(ii) (1983).
39. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit based its decision on "the purposes" of the program,
after concluding guidance was not available by looking at the legislative history,
which did not address the specific question at issue. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. Gorsuch, 22 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Because the purpose of the
program was to reduce emissions (as opposed to simply maintaining current
emission levels), the Court found the EPA definition "inappropriate," and set aside
the regulations. Id. at 276.
40. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The Court expanded on the meaning of a
"permissible" construction of statute in a footnote, explaining that the court was not
required to conclude that "the agency construction was the only one it permissibly
could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would
have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. This
footnote indicates that courts should not consider whether or not they think the
agency made a good policy choice, but rather that courts should limit themselves to
the legal question of whether the agencies interpretation was "permissible"essentially, not contrary to the law. Id. at 843 n. 11.
41.
LAW

Id. See also

WILLIAM

F. Fox,

341 (4th ed. 2003).

42. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.

JR., UNDERSTANDING

ADMINISTRATIVE
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reasonable.43 Chevron is significant because it establishes the rule
that Courts are to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of
the agency's own ambiguous enabling statute.
The opinion
extinguishes the judiciary's freedom to replace its own judgment for
that of the agency unless the agency's interpretation is clearly in
contention with Congressional intent.44 If consistently applied,

43. Id. The Court's ruling in Chevron was significant. In the words of Justice
Antonin Scalia, "Chevron has proven a highly important decision-perhaps the
most important in the field of... administrative law since Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC." Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretationsor Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512 (1989).

Justice Scalia goes on to

point out that "in the first three and a half years after its announcement-up to the
beginning of 1988-Chevron was cited by lower federal courts over 600 times."
Id. See also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and JudicialDeference to
Agency Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM L. REv. 612 (1996). As one
scholar summarized:
Accordingly, it should be unsurprising that Chevron deference
rests ...

on the premises of constitutional derivation.

Chevron

embraces the assumption that if a silent or ambiguous statute
leaves an interpreter room to choose among reasonable
alternative understandings, the interpretive choice entails the
exercise of substantial policymaking discretion ...

effect[ing] a

delegation of lawmaking discretion.... Thus... when Congress
has not clearly designated the judiciary as the repository of
delegated lawmaking discretion, courts should presume that it
has assigned that discretion to the agency charged with
administering the statute.
Id. at 625-26.
44. Id. While in line with the Court's past decisions, Chevron was not the next
step on the Court's jurisprudential path toward greater deference to agercies. Only
one year prior to Chevron, the Court blatantly disregarded a statutory interpretation
of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in a 5-4 decision. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319 (1983). The facts in that case
involved FERC's interpretation of the Natural Gas Policy Act and FERC's decision
to treat owners of both natural gas pipelines and wells differently than owners of
only natural gas pipelines. Id. The dispute was known as the "first sale" dispute,
and involved hundreds of millions of dollars. Id. The Court concluded that the
agency's decision was "contrary to the history, structure and basic philosophy of
the [Natural Gas Policy Act]." Id. However, several cases prior to Chevron
indicated the Court's notable deference to agency decisions. See Scalia, supra note
43, at 513. "It should not be thought that the Chevron doctrine--except in the
clarity and the seemingly categorical nature of its expression-is entirely new law.
To the contrary, courts have been content to accept "reasonable" executive
interpretations of law for some time." Id.
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Chevron has the potential to create judicial consistency, and courts
and litigants alike would recognize the automatic deference45due to
agencies in interpreting the agencies' own enabling statutes.
Unfortunately, Chevron has not been applied consistently as
many would like--even by the Supreme Court.4 6 In Brotherhood of
47
Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co.,
the Supreme Court overturned the Federal Railroad Administration's
(FRA) interpretation of the Hours of Service Act (HSA) without even
referencing Chevron.48 The Court justified its conclusion based on
45. Even with the Skidmore analysis available, it was impossible to determine
prior to the Court's Chevron decision just how much weight the Court would give
the agency's interpretation. While Chevron does leave room for the Court to
disregard an agency interpretation that is unreasonable, the bright-line two step test
provided in Chevron makes it clear that a party opposing an agency's interpretation
not only has to show that they offer a "better" interpretation-but that the agency's
opinion itself is unreasonable-a far more difficult burden. Further, the Court's
reasoning for giving deference to agency interpretation indicates a jurisprudence
centered on the notion that agencies are better equipped to make important policy
decisions as expert bodies politically accountable to the President. In the words of
Justice Stevens:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases,
reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities
may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments . . . When a challenge to an agency construction of a
statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the
wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the
challenge must fail.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
46. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 342 (4th
ed. 2003).
47. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 516
U.S. 152 (1996).
48. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 516 U.S. at 152. This suit originated when
nine major railroads brought an action challenging the FRA's interpretation of the
HSA. Id. at 597. The purpose of the HSA was to promote railroad safety by
limiting the number of consecutive hours crew members could work and requiring
a minimum number of off-duty hours between shifts for rest. Id. at 596. One
obstacle the railroads faced in complying with HSA requirements was changing
shifts on trains traveling more than 12 hours-the maximum numbers of
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its finding that the FRA's interpretation was contrary to legislative
intent. 49 Why the Court failed to cite or apply Chevron is unknown,
but it is possible that the Court wanted to avoid the strong deferential
language in Chevron when it declined to defer to the FRA's statutory
Regardless of the Court's reasons for ignoring
interpretation.5'
Chevron, the Court's ignorance of firmly established precedent is
unfortunate. Despite the Court's shortcoming in Brotherhood of
carefully
Locomotive Engineers, Chevron has been successfully and
51
today.
law
good
remains
and
cases,
numerous
applied in
consecutive hours crew members were permitted to work-without any stops or
convenient change points. Id. The solution was to have the train stop so that a new
crew could replace the "outlaw" crew. Id. Transportation was provided for the
new and "outlaw" crews to and from the stopping point of the train. The statute
provided that time spent in transportation to a duty assignment was on-time on
duty, while time spent in transportation "to place of final release is neither time on
duty nor time off duty." Id. The controversy was whether time the "outlaw" crew
spent waiting for transportation to arrive was on-duty time. Id. The crews were
paid for this time spent waiting, but were not required to perform any railroad
functions. Id. The FRA originally said that this time should be classified as limbo
time, but changed its interpretation to conform to a Ninth Circuit ruling classifying
the time as "on-duty" for the sake of uniformity. Id. at 157. The Court struck
down the FRA's revised interpretation, holding that time spent waiting for
transportation from the duty site should be classified as limbo time. Id.
49. Id. at 162. The statute plainly states that "time spent in deadhead
transportation to a duty assignment is time on duty, but time spent in deadhead
transportation from a duty assignment to the place of final release is neither time on
nor time off duty." 49 U.S.C. § 2110(3)(b)(4). The Court was reviewing the FRA
interpretation of its own enabling act as embodied in the Federal Regulations,
which indicates an official position clearly entitled to Chevron deference if prongs
one and two are satisfied. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 516 U.S. 152.
50. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 516 U.S. at 152. It may also be possible that
the Court avoided the deference issue because the FRA's interpretive change was
prompted in the first place by a Ninth Circuit decision. These complicated facts,
however, should not have stopped the Court from discussing and clarifying the
deference issue in the case.
51. Id. There is a long line of cases applying Chevron, some with the result of
the Court upholding an agency's interpretation and others where the Court struck
down the agency's interpretation based on a finding that one of the two prongs of
Chevron was not satisfied. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court applied Chevron
and struck down an interpretation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), concluding that the agency's interpretation was contrary to legislative intent.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The plaintiff in the case was an
alien claiming asylum under §208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980, which authorizes
the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to a "refugee" who is "unable or
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After Chevron was decided, it was unclear how the Chevron
opinion impacted the Court's earlier holding in Skidmore-was it
Chevron or nothing, or did Skidmore still have a role to play?5 2 The
Court in United States v. Mead Corp. implicitly answered this
question when it directly addressed the issue of when Skidmore
should be applied as opposed to Chevron.53 In Mead, a challenge

was brought against a tariff classification ruling by the United States
Customs Services (Customs). The Court of International Trade and

unwilling to return to his home country because of a 'well founded fear' thereof on
account of particular factors." Id. at 423 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 11019(a)(42)). The
INS applied the standard of proof in § 243(h) of the act, which required plaintiff to
show that it was "more likely than not" that her fears of returning to her country
would materialize. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S at 423. The Court struck down this
interpretation, stating that the "clear probability" standard of proof does not apply
to asylum claims under §208(a), and that the reference to "fear" indicated that it
was the plaintiffs subjective mental state that mattered. Id. at 425. In so holding,
the Court rejected the INS's argument that their interpretation we more reasonable
because "it is anomalous for § 208(a) to have a less stringent eligibility standard
than § 243(h) since § 208(a) affords greater benefits than § 243(h). Id. While the
Court did apply Chevron here, many argue that the opinion "may be a slight
stepping back from the strong message of deference set out in Chevron." WILLIAM
F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 339, 342 (4th ed. 2003). A
few years later, the Court again applied Chevron and upheld an agency's
interpretation of the its own statute as embodied in the agency's first substantive
rule to be promulgated. Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991).

52. See Mead, 533 U.S. 218.
53. Id. at 218. One year prior to Mead the Court indicated that Chevron
deference is not always appropriate, especially when the agency's opinion is
expressed in a form lacking the force of law. Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576 (2000). In Christensen, the Court declined to give Chevron deference to
an opinion letter from the Fair Labor Standard Act's agency administrator. Id. The
Court reasoned that opinion letters, unlike regulations, do not have the force of law
because they are not formally adopted, instead they are informal expressions of
agency interpretive authority. Id. Additionally, the Court suggested that the lack
of formal adoption meant that the interpretation was not as carefully reasoned. Id.
The Court then concluded that an opinion letter will be deferred to only if it has the
power to persuade, and that courts should consider internal consistency,
thoroughness, and the level of thoughtfulness in determining the weight to give
agency opinion letters. Id. In the words of Justice Thomas: "Interpretations such
as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of lawdo not warrant Chevron-style deference." Id. at 587. They are "entitled to respect"
under the decision in Skidmore, but only to the extent that they are persuasive,
which was not the case in Christensen. Id.
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the district court on appeal both upheld the Custom's tariff
classification ruling, applying Chevron deference. 54 On appeal, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded for the lower court to apply
Skidmore, stating that the tariff classification ruling was not entitled
to Chevron deference or any lesser degree of deference, but was only
entitled to respect according to the degree of its persuasiveness under
Skidmore.

55

54. Mead, 533 U.S. 218. The tariff classification was issued by the United
States Customs Service pursuant to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States (HTSUS), 19 U.S.C. § 1202 , which provides that Customs shall "under the
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury,] ... fix the final
classification and rate of duty applicable to . . .merchandise" under the HTSUS.

Mead, 533 U.S. at 221-22 (citing 19 U.S.C. §1202). The Secretary provides tariff
rulings in the form of "ruling letters," which "represent the official position of the
Customs Service with respect to the particular transaction or issue described therein
and is binding on all Customs Service personnel ... until modified or revoked." Id.
(citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.8 (2000)). The ruling is then applied to transactions
involving identical articles (§ 177.9(b)(2)), but is subject to modification without
notice (§ 177.9(c)) and is to be applied to any transaction but the one described in
the letter. Id. at 223. At issue here was the Secretary's classification of plaintiffrespondent, the Mead Corporation's "day planners," described as "three-ring
binders with pages having room for notes of daily schedules and phone numbers
and addresses, together with a calendar and suchlike." Id. at 224. Between 1989
and 1993, Customs had treated Mead's binders as "other" items, which were not
subject to any tariff. Id. at 224-25. The controversy arose in January 1993, when
Customs re-categorized Mead's binders into a category for "[r]egisters, account
books, notebooks, order books, receipt books, letter pads, memorandum pads,
diaries and similar articles," which were subject to a tariff of 4.0%. Id. at 224-25.
Customs supported this decision in an opinion letter, which stated that Customs had
adopted the broader definition of "diary" as defined in the Oxford English
Dictionary. Id. at 225. The broad Oxford definition defined "diary" as "a book
calendars."' Id.
including 'printed dates for daily memoranda and jottings; also ...
(quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 321 (Compact ed. 1982)).

Mead

challenged the Custom's ruling in the Court of International Trade, which adopted
the Custom's reasoning without discussing deference. Id. Mead appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which held that Customs'
ruling was not entitled to Chevron deference and reversed the Court of
International Trade. Id. at 225-26. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at
226.
55. Id. The Court stated concisely at the opening of the opinion in Mead that
Chevron deference did not apply to Customs' ruling because the ruling was not
"promulgated in the exercise of authority" delegated by Congress. Id. at 226-27.
However, the Court later stated that "[t]he fact that the tariff classification here was
not a product of such formal process [as notice-and comment] does not alone,
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Despite the Court's intention to clarify the law, the Mead opinion
was strongly criticized by Justice Scalia in his dissent.56 Justice
Scalia argued that the Court had rendered Skidmore "anachronistic"
with its opinion in Chevron, and that the Court's present decision in
Mead to reaffirm Skidmore and attempt to differentiate between
Skidmore and Chevron was "neither sound in principle nor
sustainable in practice." 57 Scalia's criticism focused on the difficulty
that the lower courts would experience first in determining which test
to apply, and later in attempting to apply the subject "totality of the
circumstances" test established in Skidmore on the occasions they
determined appropriate.5 8 As an alternative to resurrecting Skidmore,

therefore, bar the application of Chevron." Id. at 231. The Court then expounds
on the reasons Chevron is not applicable to all forms of agency interpretation,
summarizing by stating that "classification rulings are best treated like
'interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines... [and are] beyond the Chevron pale." Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). Despite the fact that Chevron is
inapplicable, the Court admonishes the lower courts that Chevron did not
"eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may merit some
deference whatever its form, given the 'specialized experience and broader
investigations and information' available to the agency, and given the value of
uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires." Id. at 234 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40
(1944)) (internal citations omitted).
56. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 237. Scalia explained that Skidmore was sufficient in earlier times,
but that in this era "when federal statutory law administered by federal agencies is
pervasive, and when the ambiguities (intended or unintended) that those statutes
contain are innumerable, totality-of-the-circumstances Skidmore deference is a
recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation." Id. at 250.
58. Id. at 234, 250. Justice Scalia summarized the majority's holding, stating:
Only when agencies act through 'adjudication[,] notice-andcomment rulemaking, or... some other [procedure] indicat[ing]
comparable congressional intent [whatever that means]' is
Chevron deference applicable-because these 'relatively formal
administrative procedure[s] [designed] to foster ... fairness and
deliberation bespeak (according to the Court) congressional
willingness to have the agency, rather than the courts, resolve
statutory ambiguities.
Id. at 240.
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Justice Scalia proposed that all authoritative agency positions be
59
accorded Chevron deference.
Justice Scalia's dissent may be viewed as a rather accurate
predictor of the troubles to face the Court when it implemented its
rule in Mead. Only one year after Mead, in Barnhartv. Walton, the
Court retreated from its holding in Mead that only "formal" agency
interpretations are entitled to deference. 60 The Court, citing Mead,
stated that "[w]hether a court should give such [Chevron] deference
depends in significant part upon the interpretive method used and the
nature of the question at issue." 61 The Court proceeded to list factors
that led them to apply Chevron deference to the informal agency
position at issue. 62 In AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, the Court
decided to give deference to the Federal Communications
Commission's (FCC) interpretation of the term "common carriers"
even though the Ninth Circuit had already issued an opinion

59. Id. To be authoritative, Justice Scalia proposed that an agency
interpretation "must represent the judgment of central agency management,
approved at the highest levels." Id. at 258. He goes on to say that he would find an
agency position "authoritative" when the position is attacked in court and is
defended by the agency's general counsel. Id.
60. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). At issue in Barnhart was the
Social Security Administration's (SSA) interpretation of the term "disability" in the
Social Security Act. Id. The SSA interpreted "disability" as requiring that the
inability last or "be expected to last" at least twelve months. Id. at 214-15.
Further, the SSA interpreted "expected to last" as applicable only when the
inability had not yet lasted twelve months. Id. at 215. The result is that a person
who was ultimately disabled for only eleven months when his inability had
previously been expected to last at least twelve months was not "disabled." Id.
The plaintiff challenging the suit had been disabled for eleven months, and denied
benefits. Id. Plaintiff appealed, and the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding Walton
entitled to benefits. Id. at 216. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversing the
Fourth Circuit and giving Chevron deference to the longstanding agency
interpretation. Id. at 222, 225. See John H. Reese, Bursting the Chevron Bubble:
Clarifying the Scope of Judicial Review in Troubled Times, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1103 (2004).
61. Barnhart,525 U.S. at 222 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-31).
62. Barnhart, 525 U.S. at 222. The court listed the factors to determine if
Chevron should be applied to an agency's informal interpretation as including "the
interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the agency has given to the question
over a long period of time." Id.
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interpreting the word in a different way, citing Justice Scalia's dissent
in Mead 63 These cases indicate that the Court's holding in Mead is
either difficult to correctly apply or has on occasion been completely
ignored.
2. Deference to the PBGC
Within the broader questions regarding the level of appropriate
deference to agency interpretations as expressed in Skidmore,
Chevron, and Mead, the Court has issued several decisions
specifically addressing deference to the PBGC's interpretation of
ERISA. On many occasions, courts have given deference to PBGC
interpretations, 64 which are generally upheld so long as they are
based on a permissible construction of the statute. 65 Further, the

63. The opinion issued by the FCC contradicted an earlier interpretation of the
same statute by the Ninth Circuit. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871
(9th Cir. 2000). The Court held that the Ninth Circuit's prior interpretation did not
preclude the agency from issuing a revised interpretation of the statutory language
at issue, since that language was ambiguous. Id.
64. See, e.g., Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359
(1980) (the Court accepted and affirmed PGBC's definition of the term
"nonforfeitable" in concluding that plan provision limiting otherwise defined,
vested benefits to the amounts provided by the assets of the fund did not prevent
such benefits from being characterized as "nonforfeitable" within the meaning of
ERISA and thus insured by PBGC under Title IV); Boivin v. U.S. Airways, Inc.,
446 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir 2006) (holding that the plaintiff beneficiaries must exhaust
administrative remedies before challenging in court the PBGC's interpretation of
an amendment to beneficiaries' plan as having become effective less than 60
months before the plan terminated); Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 892 F.2d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the regulation requiring
employer to distribute excess earnings to its employees upon termination of
contributory defined benefit plan was a reasonable interpretation of ERISA pension
plan termination provisions); Blessitt v. Ret. Plan For Employees of Dixie Engine
Co., 848 F.2d 1164 (11 th Cir. 1988) (deferring to PBGC interpretation that when a
plan is terminated ERISA did not require that employees receive retirement
benefits they would have received had they continued to work to normal retirement
age).
65. Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Safeway, Inc., 229 F.3d
605 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Court has held on several occasions that66PBGC's interpretations of
ERISA are owed "substantial deference."
The "landmark" case exemplifying judicial deference to the
PBGC is Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporationv. LTV Corp.67 The
question presented in LTV Corp. was whether or not PBGC's policy
of using its power to restore terminated pension plans, where the
employer had implemented an abusive follow-on plan, was 68a
permissible construction of the PBGC's restoration powers.
Applying Chevron deference, the Court affirmed PBGC's
construction of ERISA, finding the construction reasonable and
therefore entitled to deference. In doing so, the Court rejected LTV
Corporation's arguments based on ERISA's legislative history and
have
the considered amendments to ERISA by Congress that would
69
expressly authorized the PBGC to prohibit follow-on plans.
3. Deference to Agency Litigation Positions
The question of whether Chevron deference should be applied to
an agency's interpretation expressed in the context of litigation has
been considered repeatedly by courts and legal scholars, and is
relevant here because the PBGC in Beck expressed its interpretation
of ERISA as amicus curiae. However, most prior discussions on this
66. Blessitt, 848 F.2d at 1172 n.19. ("We note that we owe particularly great
deference to PBGC interpretations of Title IV of ERISA, which encompasses the
allocation and termination provisions addressed in this opinion."). See Belland v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 726 F.2d 839, 843 (D.C. Cir.1984) ("PBGC's
interpretation of ERISA is entitled to great deference. We do not rely solely on
great deference here, however, because PBGC's interpretation of section 1461(b)
was consistent with the plain language of ERISA."). See also U.S. Steelworkers of
Am. v. Harris and Sons Steel Co., 706 F.2d 1289, 1296 (3d Cir.1983); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 935 (1979) ("[T]he determination of the PBGC . .. is entitled to great
deference in the construction and application of ERISA"). The Court accorded
Chevron deference to the PBGC's interpretation in these cases, all of which were
decided prior to Mead. Blessitt, 848 F.2d at 1172.
67. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
68. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006).
69. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633. LTV Corporation argued that Congress's
consideration of statutory amendments that would have expressly granted the
PBGC the right to prohibit follow-on plans indicated that ERISA as enacted did not
grant the PBGC these powers. Id.
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issue focused on situations where the agency, itself, was a party to
the litigation, as opposed to a situation like in Beck, where the agency
was involved as amicus curiae. Considering statutory interpretations
expressed in the context of litigation by an agency party to the
litigation, one scholar wrote that:
It is hard to conceive that an interpretation put forward
in argument, without previously having been laid
down in a form bearing the force of law, could bind
the court to which it is presented. An agency may not
simply declaim 'this is our interpretation-under
Chevron you must accept it,' and prevail.... It is one
thing to extend special consideration to the agency
view, even when it is expressed only in a litigation
It is quite
position... Skidmore counsels no less ....
something else for a court to deem itself bound by
[those words]. . . . Independent deliberation of the
interpretive issue, joined with special consideration of
the agency's views, is the proper judicial posture. 7"
The debate on deference to an agency's interpretation presented
in litigation has been joined by several circuit courts, with the general
consensus that no deference is due such interpretations presented in
litigation.7" The Ninth Circuit concluded that an interpretation first

70. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens
and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. on REG. 1, 60-61 (1990).
71. See supra note 55. While courts have declined to give deference to agency
opinions expressed in litigation, they have on occasion applied Chevron to opinions

expressed in formats other than formal rulemaking or adjudication. See Anthony,
supra note 70. In Mattox v. FTC the Court applied Chevron deference to an
interpretation expressed in an agency affidavit that was identical to an
interpretation expressed by the agency in adjudication. Id. at 61. In Chapman v.
Dep't of HHS, the Court even gave deference to explanatory material published
alongside an agency regulation. Id. The application of Chevron deference in these
cases may be criticized as inappropriate. As one scholar commented:
[A] more precise approach in [Mattox and Chapman] would have

been to treat the agency interpretation as information entitled to
special consideration as the court deliberates its own best
estimate of the statute's meaning . . .[If] Congress has [not

delegated the authority to issue interpretations having the force
of law in the format used by the agency], the court generally
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provided on the onset of litigation was "entitled to no more deference
than is the interpretation of any party in the suit."'7 2 Similarly, the
Eleventh Circuit declined to apply Chevron deference to an agency's
interpretation first presented in the context of litigation because to do
otherwise would "effectively [deny the claimant] the right to
appellate review."73 Finally, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, also
declined to apply Chevron deference, but declined to go so far as
stating it would be inappropriate in every situation. 74 Concurring,
Justice Silberman took an opposing stance on the deference issue and
applied Chevron deference to the Internal Revenue Service's position
upon concluding that "it is enough that the agency, through its
counsel, set forth its interpretation of the statute at the first moment
when it was appropriate and relevant to do so. '' 75 Justice Silberman
further cautioned courts against refusing to give any deference to
agency litigation positions because applying deference was not
"excessive judicial intervention. 76
should undertake an independent interpretation of the statute,
granting the agency's views the special consideration called for
by Skidmore. For informal formats not carrying force of law
Chevron ... should not be used at all.

Id. at 63. In other words, under the Mead analysis, Skidmore would have been the
more appropriate test to apply in these two cases.
72. Bregsal v. Brock, 833 F.2d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The Department did
not construe § 1802(3) in its amended form until the onset of this litigation. The
Secretary's construction is entitled to no more deference than is the interpretation
of any party in the suit.").
73. William Bros., Inc. v. Pate, 833 F.2d 261, 265 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e do
not agree that the Director's mere litigation position is due to be given deference.
Common sense tells us that if deference were always to be given to the Director's
litigation position, then the claimant would be effectively denied the right to
appellate review.. If the Secretary has a position he wishes to express, he can do it
through the proper forum, i.e., the implantation of new clarifying regulations.").
74. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 162 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (en banc).
75. Id. at 166 (Silberman, J., concurring).
76. Id. Consideration of the original language of Justice Silberman's
concurring opinion is helpful:
Were the rule to be otherwise-were the courts to withhold
deference unless an agency asserted its interpretation of a statute
in a formal adjudication or agency rulemaking-we would be
creating a strong incentive for government agencies and
departments to undertake their business strictly through formal
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As this section indicates, there is a substantial body of law
considering the appropriate level of deference due to agency
interpretations, beginning with the framework established in
Chevron, Skidmore, and Mead. In addition, there are several cases
applying the Chevron framework in the specific context ERISA and
the PBGC. Finally the Court has also considered the application of
Chevron in the context of litigation. All of these cases are significant
to the Court's holding in Beck and lay the foundation for
understanding the current relationship between judicial review and
deference.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF BECK

Crown Paper, a corporation, and its parent company, Crown
Vantage (collectively Crown) were manufacturers of paper products
with 2,600 employees in seven locations. v In March 2000, Crown
78
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and began liquidating assets.
During the liquidation process, PBGC filed proofs of claims totaling
millions of dollars representing the liability it would have to assume
in order to take over Crown's various pension plans.79 To address
the stumbling block to plan confirmation posed by the PBGC proofs
of claim, Crown began investigating the possibility of effecting a
"standard termination" of certain defined-benefit pension plans
through the purchase of an annuities in July 2001.80 Shortly after
procedures. Although judicial review of administrative action
has seemed in recent times to push in that direction, I doubt that
much good can come of this trend or, more importantly, that it is
justified by congressional direction. We should take care that a
doctrine developed to restrain the judiciary not be transformed to
serve as a justification for excessive judicial intervention.
Id. at 166 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)).
77. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2314.
78. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2310.
79. Id.
80. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2314. A defined-benefit pension plan is one where "the
employee, upon retirement, is entitled to a fixed periodic payment." Id. (citing
Comm'r v. Keystone Consol. Indust., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 154 (1993)). In this type
of plan, the employer is responsible for investment risks and must make up for any
deficits in the plan. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2314 (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1999)). It is also the employer, however, who
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Crown began looking into effecting a "standard termination," PACE
International Union (PACE) instead proposed that Crown merge
seventeen of Crown's hourly employee plans into the Pace Industrial
Union Management Pension Fund (PIUMPF), a multi-employer
plan. 81 Crown and PACE met to discuss the possibility of merger,
and Crown subsequently requested and received additional
information on PACE's merger proposal.82
In late September 2001, Crown reviewed preliminary
annuitization bids. 83 Crown learned that the annuitization of certain
pension plans was possible and that the process might also create a
"reversion" of residual plan assets to the company for its creditors'
benefit. 84 The PBGC agreed to release its claims against the Crown
bankruptcy estate if Crown annuitized its pension plans. 8 5 In
October 2001, Crown received final annuitization bids and decided to
merge eleven of its hourly-employee pension plans into a twelfth.86
Crown then terminated the merged plan through the purchase of an
$84 million annuity from the Hartford Life Insurance Company.87
The annuitization provided all plan participants with 100% of their
accrued plan benefits and created a reversion of approximately $5
million in surplus plan assets for Crown's creditors.88 Responsibility
for Crown's other five under-funded hourly plans reverted to
Georgia Pacific Company-the successor of a prior sponsor of the

enjoys the benefits when a plan performs beyond expectations, by making reduced
payments to the plan or receiving a reversion of plan assets. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at
2314.
81. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2314. A multi-employer plan is "a collectivelybargained plan maintained by more than one employer, usually within the same or
related industries, and a labor union." See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (2008).
82. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2314.
83. Id.

84. Id. Employers can recoup residual plan assets of over-funded plans under
ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1)(A) (2008). When a company terminates a plan, no

participant has a claim to any assets of the plan, but only to the defined level of
benefits that the plan promises. Hughes Aircraft v. Jacobson 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
85. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2315.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Employers can recoup residual plan assets of over-funded plans under
ERISA. §1344(d)(1)(A).
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plans-pursuant to a prior agreement between Georgia Pacific,
Crown and PBGC. 89
PACE intervened in Crown's Chapter 11 bankruptcy on behalf of
the employees covered by the single-employer defined-benefit
pension plans (Plans) sponsored and administered by Crown
(Employees). 90 PACE alleged that Crown's directors breached their
fiduciary duty to their Employees by rejecting PACE's proposal to
terminate the Plans by merging them with PACE's own multiemployer plan and electing instead for a standard termination through
the purchase of annuities. 91 PACE sought injunctive relief for two
reasons: (1) rescinding the purchase of the Hartford annuity and (2)
preventing Crown from distributing the $5 million reversion to
92
Crown creditors.
After an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court issued oral
findings of Fact on December 11, 2001. 9' The bankruptcy court
concluded that Crown did violate its fiduciary duties by failing to
adequately consider PACE's merger offer. 94 The Court held that
Crown's decision between annuitizing the pension plans and merging
them into PIUMPF constituted a discretionary act, and hence, Crown
had a fiduciary duty to fully explore PACE's proposal, which Crown

89. Brief for Pet., Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007) (No. 051148).
90. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2316.
91. Brief for Pet., Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007) (No. 051148).
92. Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310. PACE did not, however, seek the rescission of
Crown's transfer of the five under-funded plans to Georgia Pacific. Id. Note that
the case was generated by a dispute over where the five million dollar reversion
resulting from the termination of the plan should go. Of course, the corporation
wanted the reversion and was entitled to it under ERISA. Id. Additionally, it is
interesting to note that Crown owed a fiduciary duty to its creditors, and it is worth
questioning whether Crown would have violated this duty by simply giving the
reversion to the Union or directly to the plan members, since neither party was
legally entitled to the reversion. In the Court's own terms: ". . . by diligently
funding its pension plans, Crown became bait for a union bent on obtaining a
surplus that was rightfully Crown's. All this after Crown purchased an annuity that
none dispute was sufficient to satisfy its commitments to plan participants and
beneficiaries." Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2321.
93. Brief for Pet., Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (No. 05-1148).
94. Id. at 6.
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failed to do. 95 The bankruptcy court partially granted PACE's
motion for a preliminary injunction. 96
The district court concluded that "Crown's directors, failing to
consider the merger option seriously while acting as the plan
' 97
administrator,

fiduciary
appealed. 98

breached

Subsequently, Crown

the

duties

under

ERISA.

,

The Ninth Circuit held that Crown had a fiduciary obligation to
make the decision between the two "with an eye single to the
interests of the participants and beneficiaries." 99 In so holding, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted ERISA and the PBGC's own regulations as
permitting merger as a form of termination.1 00 The Ninth Circuit

denied Crown's petition for a panel rehearing; instead, suggesting a

95. Id. at 7-8.
96. Id. at 6. The judge acknowledged that Crown would face penalties up to
$4 million if it tried to unwind its purchase of annuities from Hartford, Crown's
selected insurance provider. Brief for Resp't at 2, Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007) (
No. 05-1148). Therefore, the judge allowed Crown's purchase of the Hartford
annuity to go forward, but ordered that all remaining assets (in this case, $5
million) of the terminated plans be placed in an interest-bearing account pending
final decision on the matter. Id.
97. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2316.
98. Id.
99. Brief for Pet. at 9, Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007) (No. 05-1148); Brief for
Appellant at 16-17, Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007) (No. 05-1148) (quoting
Pilkington PLC v. Perelman, 72 F.3d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1995)).
100. Brief for Pet. at 9, Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007) (No. 05-1148). The
Ninth Circuit focused on the language of ERISA Section 4041(b)(3) which
provides that "the plan administrator must in accordance with all applicable
requirements under the Code and ERISA, distribute plan assets in satisfaction of all
plan benefits by purchase of an irrevocable commitment from an insurer or in
anotherpermittedform." Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Court asserted
that the PBGC's own regulations supported the conclusion that merger was a form
of termination, citing 29 CFR § 4041.28(c)(1) which states that "the plan
administrator shall--(i) purchase irrevocable commitments from an insurer to
provide all benefit liabilities under the plan, or (ii) in accordance with the
provisions of the plan and any applicable regulations, otherwise fully provide all
benefit liabilities under the plan." Id. The 9th Circuit's reasoning suggests that the
Supreme Court in this case went somewhat beyond the norms of judicial deference
to agency interpretations. Id. Here, the Court held PBGC's interpretation wasn't
clear in a published agency regulation-it was simply presented in the course of
litigation. Id. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit did not find an agency opinion in this
form worthy of deference. Id.
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rehearing en banc, even though both the Department of Labor and the
PBGC supported the petition as separate amicus curiae. 101
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
reversed, holding that Crown did not breach its fiduciary obligations
in failing to consider PACE's merger proposal because merger is not
102
a permissible form of termination.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court,
reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision and displaying remarkable
deference to the PBGC's interpretation of ERISA. Because the Court
identified the question of whether or not a merger is a form of
termination as precursory to the fiduciary duty issues raised, the
Court never reached the fiduciary duty issue despite a lengthy
briefing and oral argument on the issue. 103
The Court's focus on the threshold legal question of whether or
not merger is a form of termination is logical; upon concluding that
merger is not a form of termination, the fiduciary duty question
became purely hypothetical. 0 4 However, the contents of the opinion
are somewhat surprising, because the Supreme Court hearing
transcript and both parties' briefs paid particular attention to the
application of the fiduciary duty standard, because the merger was
assumed an acceptable form of termination.' 05 Ultimately, it was the
Court's consideration of the meaning of ERISA and deference to the
PBGC's interpretation that directed the holding in Beck.
101. Id.
102. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2310.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 2316. Justice Scalia clearly stated that whether "merger is, in the
first place, apermissible form of plan termination under ERISA" was an antecedent
question to whether Crown owed a fiduciary duty to consider PACE's merger
proposal. Id.
105. Brief for Pet. at 9, Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (2007) (No. 05-1148). The
attorney for PACE pursued two separate arguments for why the Court should
overrule the Ninth Circuit: (1) employers owe no fiduciary duty to consider merger,
and (2) the merger is not a valid form of termination in the first place. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 11, Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310 (No. 05-1148). Despite
establishing these two independent arguments, Mr. Baker's discussion before the
Court focused almost entirely on the fiduciary duty issue. Id.
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It is important to note that while the Court unanimously deferred
to PBGC's interpretation, it did acknowledge that "the phrase
'otherwise fully provide all benefit liabilities under the plan' [was]
not without some teeth."' 10 6 The Court reasoned that the language of
the statute did not cover mergers with the "clarity necessary to
disregard the PBGC's considered views." 10 7 The Court identified
10 8
three points that persuaded it to accept the PBGC's interpretation.
First, terminating a plan through the purchase of annuities formally
severs the applicability of ERISA to plan assets and employer
obligation. 109 In contrast, ERISA continues to apply upon merger.10

106. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2318 (citing § 1341(b)(3)(A)(ii)). The Court,
however, quickly stated that despite the phrase "otherwise provide," the PBGC
interpretation that merger was not a form of termination could be reasonably based
on a determination that it was "not like the purchase of annuities in its ability to
fully provide all benefits" or that ERISA's distinct treatment of merger and
termination showed that the two were separate and distinct options. Id. Earlier in
its opinion (before switching its focus to whether or not merger is a form of
termination), the Court commented that while PACE's argument was "an odd one,"
it did become "more plausible," once the Court realized that merger is "simply a
transfer of assets and liabilities." Id. at 2316. The Court explains that an annuity is
also "akin to a transfer of assets and liabilities to an insurance company, and if
Crown was subject to fiduciary duties in selecting an annuity provider, why could it
automatically disregard PIUMPF simply because PIUMPF happened to be a
multiemployer plan?" Id.
107. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2318 (quoting Tilley, 490 U.S. at 725). The Court also
quoted Mead to support the statement that the Court had "traditionally deferred to
the PBGC when interpreting ERISA." Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing Mead, 490
U.S. at 722).
108. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2318.
109. Id. The language of the PBGC's regulations reinforces the significance
that the purchase of an annuity severs the applicability of ERISA, while merger
does not. Id. The regulations require that the notice of plan termination informs
participants that the PBGC will no longer guarantee their benefits after distribution.
29 C.F.R. 4041.23(b)(9); see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Resp't at 22, Beck,127 S. Ct. 2310 (No. 05-1148). Because the PBGC continues to
guarantee benefits under a merged plan, a "termination by merger" as suggested by
PACE, would be unable to satisfy 29 C.F.R. § 4041.23(b)(9). Beck, 127 S. Ct. at
2321. This argument was made clear by the United States in their brief, and is
acknowledged by the Court, which cited the code section followed by a
parenthetical describing that "this requirement of course has no relevance to a
merger, because after a merger, the PBGC continues to guarantee plan benefits."
Id. at 2320. The Court does not take this point any further; rather, it mentions in a
long list of differences between the procedures involved in termination and those
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Second, standard termination allows the employer to recoup surplus
funds, which is not possible in merger."' Third, the structure of
ERISA amply supports the conclusion that section 1342(b)(3)(A)(ii)
does not cover merger.11 2 The Court also concluded the PBGC's
construction of the statute was "eminently reasonable" from a policy

involved in merger. Id. This is peculiar because PBGC's regulations specifically
require notice that PBGC oversight ends upon termination and PBGC interpreted
ERISA, through its own regulations, as not allowing merger as a form of
termination. Id. at 2321. If it could have been established that PBGC clearly
disallowed merger by its own regulations, there would have been a strong argument
for greater deference to be given to PBGC's interpretation of ERISA, because it
would have been an opinion that had withstood § 501 rulemaking, rather than an
opinion presented in an amicus brief during the middle of litigation.
110. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2321. Because termination ends the applicability of
ERISA, it also ends the PBGC's responsibility to insure the plan's assets.
Consequently, upon termination, beneficiaries look solely to their annuity provider
for funds. Id. In contrast, ERISA continues to apply upon merger, with the PBGC
continuing to insure plan assets, however at a greatly reduced rate. Id. At first
glance, minimal insurance by the PBGC may sound more secure than looking
solely to an annuity provider-essentially an independent insurer. Id. However,
merger of a single-employer pension plan with a multi-employer pension plan is
probably the higher risk, because upon merger the assets of the solvent singleemployer plan may be used to pay benefits to beneficiaries other than those under
the original plan. Id. In addition, there is a real possibility the multi-employer plan
could at some point in the future become insolvent. This raises an interesting
question-why would an employer choose merger over termination through the
purchase of annuities if its choice between the two was fiduciary? In other words,
if PACE prevailed in establishing merger as a form of termination, how would
PACE show that merger rather than termination was in the best interests of the
Crown Plan beneficiaries? A full analysis of this question is beyond the scope of
this note. However, it is interesting to note that Crown employee benefits would be
the same (no more and no less) upon merger as they would upon termination,
because plan benefits were fixed. Brief of Resp't at 19, Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310
(2007) (No. 05-1148). Further, PACE pointed out that insurers, like multiemployer plans, do not segregate their funds. Id. Consequently, it is possible-and
both the Department of Labor and the PBGC have recognized-that "due to poor
investment choices.., unexpected claims.., or other contingencies" an insurance
company will default on its promises to participants receiving annuity payments,
and that these participants will not receive the full benefits promised to them. Id. at
25.
111. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2320.
112. Id.
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standpoint."1 3 Finally, the Court dismissed PACE's argument that
three PBGC opinion letters
suggested that merger was an acceptable
4
"
form of termination.
Though the Court's analysis was focused on the reasonableness
of PBGC's interpretation, the Court never even mentioned Skidmore
or Chevron.1 15 Further, the Court never discussed the form of
PBGC's opinion letter and the level of deference appropriate to that
form. Instead, the Court cited Mead v. Tilley, for the principle that
courts have "traditionally deferred to the [PBGC] when interpreting
[ERISA]." '1 16 This lack of discussion of the law of deference is
surprising considering it is arguably the foundation for the Court's
decision.
Despite the Court's failure to specifically state the level of
deference being applied, it appears from the language used in Justice
Scalia's opinion that the Court gave PBGC's interpretation Chevron
deference. 1' 7 While this is in line with many prior decisions where
the Court gave PBGC's interpretations of ERISA "great" deference,
it is still noteworthy after the Court's decision in U.S.v. Mead Corp.,
113. Id. The Court reasoned that from a policy standpoint, merger as a form of
termination may have detrimental consequences for the plan beneficiaries. Id. In
this case, for example, the beneficiaries would receive their full benefits if Crown
terminated the plan by purchasing annuities. However, if Crown decided to merge
the Plan with PACE's multiemployer plan, the beneficiaries might be at risk
because assets of the original plan could be used to satisfy commitments of the
multi-employer plan to other participants of the multiemployer plan. If the multiemployer plan became under-funded, the beneficiaries may find their benefits
threatened in view of the lesser guarantees the PBGC provides to multi-employer
plans. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (2008) and 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2008).
114. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2317. Petitioners strongly argued-and the Court
agreed- these opinion letters did not support merger as a form of termination.
Beck, 127 S.Ct. at 2317 n.3. The letters addressed a problem situation where
employers would maneuver to "reach surplus assets in their pension plans without
purchasing annuities for all plan participants and beneficiaries, which the
employers would have been required to do if they entirely terminated the plans."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Resp't at 25, Beck, 127 S.
Ct. 2310 (2007) (No. 05-1148).
115. See generally Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2310.
116. Id. at 2317. Mead established that Skidmore is the correct standard for the
level of deference owed agency opinions issued informally and is only entitled to
"respect according to degree of its persuasiveness." Id.
117. See generally Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310. The Court's focus on the
"reasonableness" of the PBGC's interpretation suggests Chevron deference.
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where the Court differentiated between when to apply Skidmore and
when to apply Chevron.118 The Court's reliance on Chevron is
evidenced by the Court's language in several ways. First, the Court
focused on whether or not the PBGC's interpretation was
"reasonable," rather than "persuasive."'' 19 If the Court was applying
Skidmore, it would not have concerned itself with the reasonableness
of PBGC's interpretation, but rather would have given the agency's
opinion weight according to its persuasiveness. Second, the Court
stated that in reviewing the Ninth Circuit's opinion, they would
"examine whether the PBGC's policy is based upon a permissible
construction of the statute," implying that the Court would have
upheld the PBGC's interpretation so long as it was not contrary to the
clear meaning of the statute. 120 Further, the Court stated that PACE
had "failed to persuade [it] that the PBGC's views [were]
unreasonable," again indicating Chevron deference. 121
V.

LEGAL IMPACT

There are several ways that members of the legal community may
view the Beck opinion. If the viewer is a pension-plan sponsor or
fiduciary counselor they will likely breathe a sigh of relief knowing
that they do not owe a fiduciary duty to consider merger options in
the course of plan termination. 122 If they are affiliated with the
PBGC or were otherwise involved as amicus curiae for the
respondents in Beck, they will enjoy the victory of having their
interpretation of ERISA prevail. If they are an employee union they
will likely feel remorse. Despite the aforementioned mixed feelings,
the legal community as a whole might overlook the legal significance
of the Court's language as it gave deference to the PBGC's
interpretation.

118. See supra note 39.

119. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2320.
120. Id. at 2317.
121. Id. at 2318.
122. Michael R. Maryn, ALI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COURSE
OF STUDY MATERIALS, WHAT'S NEW IN EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: A SUMMARY OF
CURRENT CASE AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, (Oct. 4-5 2007).
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A. The Extreme Deference Given to the PBGC by the Court is
the Most Compelling Aspect of Beck
While many parties were anxious for the Court to overturn the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Beck, the Court's decision wasn't a
"surprise," as its unanimity suggests.123 The reasonableness of the
Court's final conclusion consequently may mask the significant
impact Beck may have on the future of administrative law. As noted
recently in the American Law Reports, the "most compelling aspect"
of Beck may perhaps be "the degree of deference the Court accorded
the PBGC with respect to its interpretation of ERISA, particularly
where ...the agency's views [were] expressed in the context of
litigation rather than under rulemaking subject to notice and
comment." 124 The Court's opinion in Beck exemplifies the confusion
surrounding when and how much deference is owed to administrative
statutory interpretations.
The Court's failure to concretely state the level of deference and
the mixed signals in the Court's language make it difficult, at first
glance, to determine what standard of review the Court applied to
PBGC's interpretation. 125 This ambiguity cannot be overlooked. As
the Court acknowledged in Mead, there is a substantial difference
between Skidmore and Chevron deference - there is a substantial
difference between simply considering an agency's interpretation and
deferring to that interpretation so long as it is reasonable. 2 6 Many
times there is more than one reasonable interpretation of a statutesometimes each interpretation is equally persuasive, but other times
one position may stand out as "more probable." In Beck, the Court
found PBGC's interpretation was "more probable."' 27 The main
question is, what would the Court have held if it had only found the
PBGC's interpretation "equally probable," to other interpretations, or

123. Id.
124. 178 A.L.R. Fed. 129 § 23 Cumulative Supplement (2007).
125. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. While the Court applies
Skidmore in Beck, the Court's analysis seems very close to the "reasonableness"
inquiry under Skidmore. This ambiguity is compounded by the fact that the Court

does not clearly state the level of deference they are giving to the PBGC in Beck.
126. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2320.
127. See id.
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"less probable," but still "reasonable?" Would the Court have still
28
deferred to the PBGC?1

B. The Court's Languagein Beck May Indicate the Court's
ConsiderationofJustice Scalia 's Argument Not to
Differentiate Between Skidmore and Chevron.
The fact that the PBGC's interpretation of ERISA was expressed
through an amicus brief cannot be overemphasized. If the PBGC had
instead expressed its views through formal rulemaking procedure, the
Court's application of Chevron here would have been completely
predictable. But the emphasis of the Court's opinion in Mead was
that not all agency interpretations merit the same level of
deference.' 29 Consequently, the Court's imposition of Chevron here
may indicate the abandonment of Mead and consistent application of
Chevron deference to agency interpretations regardless of their
30
form. 1

In attempting to assess the significance of the Court's decision in
Beck, it is helpful to take a closer look of the views of Justice
Scalia-Beck's author--on judicial
deference
to agency
interpretations of their own statutes. In a speech at Duke Law
School, Justice Scalia remarked: "It is not immediately apparent why
a court should ever accept the judgment of an executive agency on a

128. The Court's language suggests that it would. See supra notes 116-18 and
accompanying text.
129. Mead, 533 U.S. 218. As one scholar recently summarized the importance
of the form of an agency's interpretation:
[I]n Mead the Court made clear that it is only when the agency
actually employs its delegated authority to make a legal
determination that it will be accorded Chevron deference ....
Failure to exercise delegated authority to interpret in a format
having the force of law leaves the agency with nothing except its
executive power upon which to assert that its decision warrants
deference. But Christensen, Mead, and Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation make it clear that such
interpretations warrant only Skidmore-Christensen persuasive
deference.
John H. Reese, Bursting the Chevron Bubble: Clarifying the Scope of Judicial
Review in Troubled Times, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1103, 1196 (2004).
130. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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question of law."'1 31 He further explained, "to say that ... [agency]
views, if at least reasonable, will ever be binding-thatis, seemingly,
a striking abdication of judicial responsibility."' 132 Justice Scalia
emphasized that the courts do not defer because of their inability to
make policy decisions:
Only when the court concludes that the policy
furthered by neither textually possible interpretation
will be clearly "better" (in the sense of achieving what
Congress apparently wished to achieve) will it,
pursuant to Chevron, yield to the agency's choice.
But the reason it yields is assuredly not that it has no
constitutional competence to consider and evaluate
policy.

33

Yet, Justice Scalia continued to quickly confirm his agreement
with the Chevron decision, discussing the various legal foundations
34
for the rule of deference.'
131. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 989 DUKE L.J. 511, 513 (1989).
132. Id. at 514.
133. Id. at 515.
134. Id. Scalia first acknowledges that while the "expertise" of agencies is an
attractive reason to give deference to their interpretations, it is not in and of itself a
foundation or "valid theoretical justification" for doing so. Id. at 514. In addition,
Justice Scalia states that deference is appropriate based on the constitutional
principle of the separation of powers. Id. He summarizes the theory as follows:
When, in a statute to be implemented by an executive agency,
Congress leaves an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by text or
legislative history,
the "traditional
tools of statutory
construction," the resolution of that ambiguity necessarily
involves policy judgment. Under our democratic system, policy
judgments are not for the courts but for the political branches;
Congress having left the policy question open, it must be
answered by the Executive.
Id. at 515. After acknowledging his "fond[ness] ... of the separation of powers,"
he states that he cannot agree with the majority's approach to judicial deference.
Id. He then gives the theory which he adopts--essentially that deference is
appropriate because that is what Congress intended. Id. at 516. He acknowledges
the line of pre-Chevron cases that acknowledge two possible intentions of Congress
whenever there is an ambiguity in a statute: "(1) Congress intended a particular
result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the
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Scalia concluded that under Chevron, agency discretion is
presumed and merits deference whenever Congress leaves an area of
a law ambiguous because it is assumed that "Congress ... meant to
leave its resolution to the agency."'1 35 He then expounded on some of
the positive impacts of Chevron, focusing on the opinion's allowance
of agencies and courts to "ungrudgingly" accept changes to agency
interpretations.' 36 Additionally, Scalia pointed out the potential of
the Chevron opinion to decrease the significance placed on the form
of an agency's opinion is acknowledged-even to the extent of
applying deference to agency interpretations first presented in the
context of litigation.1 37 Scalia points out that one's personal reaction

subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency." Id. Pre-Chevron, courts
would consider agency's expertise, the complexity of the question presented, and
the extent of the agency's rulemaking authority to determine if Congress intended
the first or second alternative described. Id. As Scalia read the Chevron opinion,
the result of Chevron was that all ambiguities are presumed to mean that Congress
intended agency discretion. Id.
135. Id. Justice Scalia did not defend the presumption of congressional intent
in Chevron, stating that it was beyond the scope of his lecture. Id. However, he did
point out that "the quest for 'genuine' legislative intent [was] probably a wildgoose chase anyway." Id. He reasoned that in most cases "Congress neither (1)
intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but
rather (3) didn't think about the matter at all." Id. at 517. He then argued that
Chevron was sufficient for establishing a predictable process for the filling-in of
legislative ambiguities. Id.
136. Id. at 518. Justice Scalia points out that one of the greatest advantages of
Chevron from a political theory perspective is that it does not consider the length
and consistency of the agency's view in considering what deference should be
given. In turn this allows the agency greater flexibility to amend its interpretation
when necessary to better serve the purpose of the statute and needs of the public.
Id. In contrast, when a court makes an interpretation, only legislation can change
it, unless the Court overrules its own interpretation-an act avoided whenever
possible for purposes ofresjudicata. Id.
137. Scalia, supra note 134. In Scalia's words:
A position formulated not in the agency's adjudication process,
nor in rulemaking, but in a brief to a court, does not seem like the
last stage of an "expert" search for the truth. Once it is accepted,
however, that there are various "right" answers, and that policy
and indeed even political considerations (in the nonpartisan
sense) can legitimately affect which one the agency may choose,
then it seems less important whether the choice is made through
rulemaking and adjudication, or rather through a formal
presentation of the agency's position in court .

. .

. [If in the
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to Chevron is often attributed to how often one finds statutes
ambiguous, and consequently, how often one believes Chevron must
be applied.1 38 Justice Scalia concluded that it would likely take time
for the full meaning of Chevron to be explored and understood by the
courts, but expressed his belief that Chevron would endure. This
was, in part, because Chevron was easier to follow than prior case
law, but primarily because it "more accurately reflect[ed] the reality
of government, and thus more adequately serve[d] its needs."139
While Justice Scalia's comments are clearly the result of careful
analysis and consideration, he made one comment that appears
incongruent-a Court will only yield to an agency interpretation
under Chevron when neither statutory interpretation is "better." This
seems at odds, both with the ruling in Chevron and his statement that
when Chevron deference is due, Courts should only consider whether
the agency has acted within the scope of its discretion. 140 It is
important to acknowledge that by "better" Scalia meant "in the sense

context of litigation] the matter at issue is one for which the
agency has responsibility, if all requisite procedures have been
complied with, and if there is no doubt that the position urged has
full and considered approval of the agency head, it is far from
self-evident that the agency's views should be denied their
accustomed force simply because they are first presented in the
prosecution of a lawsuit.
Id.
138. Id. Justice Scalia argues that strict-constructionists generally favor
Chevron more than those who are more likely to find the meaning of statutes
ambiguous. See id. at 521. The reason is that a strict constructionist will usually
find the meaning of a statute clear on its face, and often will not be bound by an
agency's "reasonable" interpretation because the second prong of Chevron will
rarely be reached. Id. In contrast, if a person finds statutes ambiguous, they will
often find the first prong of Chevron satisfied, meaning they will have to accept
"reasonable" interpretations of agencies with which they do not agree more often.
See Id.
139. Id. at 521.
140. Scalia, supra note 134, at 515. It is difficult to reconcile Justice Scalia's
two statements, because under a true reasonableness test, the Court would not be
concerned about whether there was another interpretation that was "better" than
that chosen by the agency. Rather, the Court would limit itself to deciding if the
agency's interpretation itself was within the scope of its discretion and not contrary
to law. As the Court itself said in Chevron, an agency's interpretation can be
reasonable when it is not the only permissible construction, and even when the
court would have reached a different conclusion itself. See supra notes 37-38.
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141
of achieving what Congress apparently wished to achieve."'
Considering this definition of "better," Scalia's comment may be
reconciled by attributing it to the analysis required by prong one of
Chevron-if it was apparent what Congress wanted (if a "best"
interpretation is clear), then there would be no room for agency
discretion. This statement, however, still seems to indicate that
Chevron part two will likely be applied in rare circumstances,
as the
42
"better" intent of Congress may often be apparent. 1
It is evident Justice Scalia, along with his eight fellow Supreme
Court Justices, respect the Court's decision in Chevron and support
its holding. 143 However, Justice Scalia was the sole dissenting voice
in the Court's more recent Mead opinion, arguing that the Court
should apply Chevron deference or nothing, rather than resurrect
Skidmore. 144 Justice Scalia's dissent laid several complaints against
the Mead majority opinion, including that the opinion would: (1) lead
to irrational results by according deference based on the form of the
agencies decision; 145 (2) confuse lower courts and litigants with an
uncertain and unpredictable test; 146 (3) "artificially" increase
informal rulemaking as agencies maneuver to protect their

141. Scalia, supra note 134, at 515.
142. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
143. See generally Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310.
144. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236-43; see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text. Scalia did not give his dissent light-heartedly. Mead, 533 U.S. at 236-43. He
characterized the Mead majority opinion as "aversive." Mead, 533 U.S. at 241
(Scalia, J., dissenting). He further described the majority opinion, stating, "The
Court has largely replaced Chevron, in other words, with that test most beloved by
a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to
know what to expect): the whole 'totality of the circumstances' test." Id.
145. Mead, 533 U.S. 218. Justice Scalia illustrates this point by listing
examples of situations where decisions are "required to be made personally by a
Cabinet Secretary, without any prescribed procedures." Mead, 533 U.S. at 244
(Scalia, J., dissenting). He continues to note that under the majority's view, these
decisions will not be given any deference. Id. However, the opinions of an
administrative law judge would be accorded deference, which Justice Scalia
characterizes as "absurd, and not at all in accord with any plausible actual intent of
Congress." Id. at 245.
146. Mead, 533 U.S. 218. Scalia emphasized the ambiguity in the Court's
guidance that Chevron deference only be accorded to an "interpretation
represent[ing] the authoritativeposition of the agency." Id. at 246.
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148
opinions; 4 7 and (4) prevent flexibility in statutory interpretation.
As the foundation of his argument, Justice Scalia appears to have
reasoned that the form of an agency's statutory interpretation is
distinct from whether or not the agency has the power to interpret the
statute in the first place. 14 9 Accepting this view, it is logical that
Chevron is the only standard required, and that the agency's power-

147. Mead, 533 U.S. 218. Scalia's argument that agencies would go through
the process of informal rulemaking solely to ensure their interpretations are
accorded deference is reasonable. Whether or not agencies actually responded in
this way is unclear and unlikely (it would be a rather vain pursuit to try and identify
all potentially vague phrases in a statute and clarify them all completely). But the
point is well-made: distinguishing between agency opinions based on their form is
placing undue significance on technicalities. Scalia's apparent frustration is seen in
his presumptively sarcastic statement: "Buy stock in the GPO." Id. at 246.
148. See generally Mead, 533 U.S. 218. Scalia's concern that the Mead
decision would prevent flexibility in statutory interpretation is well-founded,
because "[o]nce the court has spoken, it becomes unlawful for the agency to take a
contradictory position; the statute now says what the court has prescribed." Id. at
241. Because the Court is making its own independent interpretation of an
ambiguous term under Skidmore (considering the agency's views, but not deferring
to it) it is establishing its interpretation as precedent. In contrast, under Chevron
the Court does not itself define the term or conclude that the agency's present
interpretation is the best and only interpretation-it is simply confirming that the
agency's present interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 853-59. In
Chevron itself, the Court acknowledged this flexibility, holding that "the
Environmental Protection Agency can interpret 'stationary source' to mean a single
smokestack, can later replace that interpretation with the 'bubble concept'
embracing an entire plant, and if that proves undesirable can return again." Mead,
533 U.S. at 247 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 853-59).
149. Mead, 533 U.S. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Scalia's words: "There
is no necessary connection between the formality of procedure and the power of the
entity administering the procedure to resolve authoritatively questions of law." Id.
at 243. An important question is "what happens when an ambiguity in a statute
first comes to light before the Court?" At that point, it would be too late for the
agency to issue a formal interpretation-does that mean the Court will interpret the
statute? According to the majority, this is the result, as the majority only gives
deference when the agency has congressional authority to act through formal
procedures and does in fact employ such procedures. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
This irrational result hardly seems in line with purposes of Chevron or
congressional intent. For example, in Beck, the PBGC had not specifically issued
any rules interpreting ERISA to clarify if merger was a form of termination.
Applying Scalia's reasoning, the fact that the PBGC's opinion was consequently
embodied in an amicus curiae brief should not bar application of Chevron.
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and not the form of its interpretation-should be the sole focus of a
reviewing court's inquiry.
A closer reading of Mead strongly suggests that Justice Scalia
approved Chevron deference to an agency's statutory interpretation
even when presented in a litigation brief. 150 In response to Justice
Scalia's dissent in Mead, the majority first acknowledged Justice
Scalia's proposal that Chevron deference should be applied to all
"authoritative" agency interpretations.1 5' The majority pointed to
what they believed to be a flaw in Justice Scalia's proposal: that
applied to the facts at hand, Scalia's "authoritativeness" guide would
52
lead to Chevron deference being denied to the Customs' ruling.'
The majority reasoned that because the Commissioner of Customs
was the "highest level" at the agency, the Secretary's classification
did not constitute the agency's "authoritative" position.153
Consequently, if Justice Scalia had insisted on deferring to Customs'
interpretation under the facts in Mead, he would under his own
standard be giving deference to the Commissioner's "official"
The majority found this
position as presented in his brief. 154
unacceptable. 155 Justice Scalia vehemently defended his position,
confirming the fact that "the General Counsel of the agency and the
Solicitor General of the United States [had] assured [the] Court that
the position represents the agency's authoritative view;" therefore, it
should have entitled the Custom's ruling to deference by the Supreme
Court, even if deference may not have been proper in the lower
courts, prior to the involvement of the General Counsel and Solicitor

150. See id. at 259.
151. See id. at 258. An agency interpretation is authoritative if it "expresses
the 'judgment of central agency management, approved at the highest levels."' Id.
at 238.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Mead, 533 U.S. at 238 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. The fact that the majority finds Justice Scalia's position of giving
deference to Custom's "authoritative" litigation position indicates that the majority
does not fully understand the distinct line of reason Justice Scalia proposed. Id.
Even under Justice Scalia's "authoritative" standard, deference could not be given
to an official agency litigating position. This shows the majority's unwillingness to
look past the form of the agency's opinion. See id.
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General. 156 Thus, an agency's official position presented in litigation
would have been within in the purview of Chevron deference as
57
applied by Justice Scalia. 1
Scalia's feelings toward Mead and his authorship of the Court's
opinion in Beck strongly support the conclusion that the Court
applied Chevron deference in reaching its conclusion in Beck. 158
Accepting that the Court did apply Chevron in Beck, it becomes
unfeasible to reconcile Beck with a continued application of Mead. 59
'
Courts may soon be acknowledging that Mead has been overruled,
quite possibly to be replaced by the "authoritativeness" approach
proposed by Justice Scalia in his Mead dissent. 160 Because the Court
was not overt in its application of Chevron, it is possible that the
significance of Beck may be overlooked for a period of time. It is
156. Id. at 258. Justice Scalia acknowledges the majority's attack on his
conclusion that Chevron deference was appropriate to Customs by the Court at this
stage in the litigation process, when Chevron deference may not have been
appropriate in the lower Court's due to the absence of an "authoritative" position.
Id. Justice Scalia states:
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, there would be nothing
bizarre about the fact that this latter approach would entitle the
ruling to deference here, though it would not have been entitled
to deference in the lower courts. Affirmation of the official
agency position before this court-if that is thought necessaryis no different from the agency's issuing a new rule after the
Court of Appeals determination. It establishes a new legal basis
for the decision, which this Court must take into account (or
remand for that purpose), even though the Court of Appeals
could not.
Id. at 259.
157. Justice Scalia acknowledges that "[t]he authoritativeness of the agency
ruling may not be a bright-line standard" but asserts that it is "infinitely brighter"
than the line the majority asks. Id. He clarifies that the "authoritativeness" line
focuses on the question of "whether [that agency's challenged interpretation] is
truly the agency's considered view, or just the opinions of some underlings, that are
at issue." Id.
158. The language used in Beck further supports the conclusion that Chevron
was applied. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
159. Mead, 533 U.S. at 238. The Mead majority balked at the idea of
according Chevron deference to an agency litigation position. Id. In fact, the
Court's unwillingness to give deference to the Secretary's position because it was
embodied in a brief for the purpose of the litigation was "why the Court [did] not
[accept] Justice Scalia's position." Id.
160. Id. at 247; see also supra note 146.
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impractical to deny that Mead is on unstable ground, or fail to
acknowledge that Scalia's campaign to disregard the form of agency
interpretations and instead focus on the "authoritativeness" of the
interpretation has gained significant ground in Beck.
One obstacle in determining Beck's impact is that the facts in
Beck did not present a "close call" between the interpretations of the
agency and the party challenging the agency's interpretation. The
Court itself stated that the PBGC's interpretation was the better
interpretation, implying that the Court would have adopted the
PBGC's views even applying Skidmore. 16 1 Consequently, the
Court's application of Chevron language to the PBGC's
interpretation of ERISA is not immediately striking as a display of
unusually heightened deference.
While many attributes of the Beck opinion indicate that the Court
was applying Chevron deference to the PBGC's interpretation, the
Court's concluding statement implies that the Court is not simply
deferring to the PBGC, but rather has concluded on its own authority
that merger is not a form of termination.1 62 However, language
structurally similar to that used in Beck has been used when the Court
was applying Chevron, and establishing that the language used to
state the Court's holding is not dispositive for determining the

161. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2320-21.
162. The Court clearly stated its holding: "We hold that merger is not a

permissible method of terminating a single-employer defined-benefit pension
plan." Id. at 2321. Compare this language to the Court's holding in Chevron: "We
hold that the EPA's definition of the term 'source' is a permissible construction of
the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with
economic growth." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. Compare with Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers (not applying Chevron): "The text, structure, and purposes
of the statute persuade us that Congress intended that time spent waiting for
deadhead transportation form a duty site should be limbo time." Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng'rs,516 U.S. 152, 162 (1996).

Compare Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp.: "We conclude that the PBGC's anti-follow-on-policy, an asserted basis for
the restoration decision, is not contrary to clear congressional intent and is based on
a permissible construction of § 4047." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 656 (1990). The Court held in Mead: "We hold that § 4044(a)(6)
does not create benefit entitlements but simply provides for the orderly distribution
of plan assets required by the terms of a defined benefit plan or other provisions of
ERISA." Tilley, 490 U.S. at 725.
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Court's level of deference. 163 Considering the Beck opinion as a
whole, it certainly appears more likely than not (despite the
ambiguities) that the Court was applying Chevron. Thus, the Beck
opinion highlights the need for greater clarity within the law of
judicial deference.
C. The Court's Opinion in Beck Placesthe Burden of
Persuasionon Any Party Opposing the PBGC's
Interpretationof ERISA
There is a strong argument that Beck represents the Court's
decision to place the burden of persuasion on any party that opposes
an agency's interpretation of its own statute. Rather than an evenhanded argument where the Court considers each side's legal
arguments without bias, the Court arguably has established that there
is something akin to a rebuttable presumption that an agency's
interpretation of its own statute is reasonable and correct-even if it
is only expressed in the context of litigation. 64 If this is in fact the
result of Beck, the case will be known and cited continually-not for
cases involving termination of ERISA benefit plans, but for
establishing agency authority in all areas of administrative law.
This presumption in favor of an agency's own interpretation is
acknowledged and encouraged by the judiciary, but generally only
where the agency gave their interpretation formally, and generally
prior to the commencement of litigation. In contrast, the PBGC did

163. See supra notes 116-17. The Court's holding in Mead is almost identical
in structure to the Court's holding in Beck. Because the Court clearly applied
Chevron in Mead, the Court's language in Beck should not be viewed as a
persuasive indicator that Chevron was not applied. Tilley, 490 U.S. at 722 (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, 842-43).
164. The Court's statement that "PACE has 'failed to persuade us that the
PBGC's views are unreasonable," is supportive of this proposition, making it
appear that any party opposing an agency's interpretation of its statute bears the
burden of proof and will lose in a fifty/fifty case. Beck, 121 S. Ct. at 2318 (citing
Tilley, 490 U.S. at 725). Further, if the Court did in fact apply Chevron in Beckand there is a strong argument it did-then no litigant challenging the
"authoritative" position of an agency can prevail unless they can show that the
interpretation fails Chevron as unreasonable. This is a much steeper burden than
proving that, while the agency's interpretation may be reasonable or permissible,
there is a "better" alternative.
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not "weigh in" with its opinion in Beck until aroused by the
bankruptcy court's opinion accepting merger as a form of
termination. While some may agree with the agency's influence in
can be made in support of the Court's
Beck, stronger arguments
65
deference to the PBGC. 1

It is difficult-if not impossible-to blame an agency for not
having the foresight to promulgate rules interpreting a portion of its
statute it did not find ambiguous in the first place. To cast this blame
would be to expect agencies to spend their time scouring their
enabling statutes for any trace of ambiguity, just so they could
promulgate official interpretations to ensure their opinions merit
Chevron deference-which is unreasonable and arguably a poor use
of always scarce government funds. Consider the specific facts in
Beck.166 The PBGC apparently had no interest in clarifying whether
merger was a form of termination under ERISA prior to the issue
being raised by PACE in bankruptcy court. 167 But once the issue was
raised, the PBGC had a tremendous interest in ensuring its
interpretation was not only acknowledged, but given deference.
Because the American judicial system survives on the doctrine of res
judicata, a contrary judicial interpretation of a statute would be
binding on the agency and all future litigants until overturned by the
courts. 161

165. At first glance, the idea of agencies essentially having a trump card to
have their interpretation of a statute prevail even when that opinion is first
expressed in the context of litigation may seem offensive to notions of fair play and
too great an abdication of judicial authority. It is important to remember that
agencies are experts in their fields and often have greater knowledge of the
potential impact of different statutory interpretations on substantive law and
society. More importantly, when the Court gives deference to an agency
interpretation, that agency retains the ability to later modify their interpretation.
This is a good thing in ambiguous areas of the law that may need to be tailor fitted
to society's needs in the moment. Further, it allows citizens unsatisfied with the
agency's decision, to put political pressure on the Executive to change the
interpretation. In contrast, once the courts weigh in, the legal interpretation is
locked in by the doctrine of res judicata and can only be modified through further
legislation or a change in the courts jurisprudence-something to be strongly
avoided.
166. Mead, 533 U.S. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 239-61.
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D. Three ProposedSolutions to the Confusion SurroundingJudicial
Deference

The Beck opinion illustrates the confusion surrounding judicial
deference, but does nothing to help solve the problem. At least three
potential solutions are available to solve the problem of deference
now facing the Court.
First, Congress could pass legislation
requiring the Court to review administrative rules and interpretations
de novo. This suggestion was a hot topic in Congress several
decades ago, but has now fallen by the wayside.' 69 While this

suggestion would certainly clarify the law, the benefits provided by
increased clarity would be unable to counter the negative impact of
requiring courts to review de novo complex areas of the law where
agencies-as experts in their field-are better equipped to ensure a

fair interpretation. 170 Additionally, requiring the courts to apply de
novo review would likely increase litigation, as parties unhappy with
agency interpretations experience increased hope that their challenge
to the agency interpretation may prevail. 171
Second, the Court could reaffirm Mead and establish a pattern of

consistent application. This would require courts to clearly state and
169. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 339 (4th
ed. 2003). During, the 97th Congress, Senator Bumpers introduced a bill that
would have directed a court reviewing an agency action to: (1) determine the
authority or jurisdiction of the agency on the basis of the language of the
authorizing statute or other evidence of legislative intent; (2) accord no
presumption in favor of or against agency action, but to give an agency's
interpretation of a statutory provision such weight as it warrants; and (3) determine
whether the factual basis of an agency rule has substantial support in the
rulemaking file. Id. However, the bill did not survive, and the passage of
legislation in this area is no longer a Congressional focus. Id.
170. Consider the complex decisions made by agencies such as the
Environmental Protection Agency. If de novo review is required, the disputes
raised by these controversies would demand a great deal of the Court's time.
171. This prediction is not empirical evidence, but is reasonable. To say that a
statute is ambiguous in the first place is to say that it is capable of being interpreted
in more than one way. When potential litigants know that there is a strong
presumption in favor of the agency's interpretation, they will naturally be less
likely to litigate a dispute "close to the line," and will be motivated to resort to the
courts only if they believe they can demonstrate the agency's interpretation is
unreasonable. In contrast, if there is no presumption in favor of the agency, there
will be a much greater incentive for litigants of disputes with strong arguments on
both sides to take their controversy to the courts.
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explain the level of review being applied in cases such as Beck.17 2
The majority in Mead was confident they reached the right
conclusion in holding that Chevron should only apply when Congress
clearly delegated authority to an agency to interpret its statute, and
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority. 173 However, cases applying Mead
demonstrate that lower courts and 74even the Supreme Court have
struggled to apply Mead's standard. 1
Third, the Court could adopt Justice Scalia's opinion and
consistently apply Chevron deference to "authoritative" agency
positions. 175 While Justice Scalia himself acknowledges that this
alternative does not provide a "bright line" test, Justice Scalia's
approach has the potential to provide courts with greater clarity while
at the same time reaching more logical results. 7 6 Beck is likely an
indication that the majority is quickly moving in the direction of
adopting Justice Scalia's "authoritativeness" test.117 This movement
of the Court, while it may create confusion in the moment, is likely
the right direction-toward a more consistent and more rational
application of the law of deference.
VI. SOCIETAL IMPACT

Beck's most immediate societal impact is on companies providing
single-employer defined benefit plans to their employees. By clearly
establishing that companies do not have to consider merger when
deciding how to implement their decision to terminate a plan, the
Court reaffirmed that decisions to merge or terminate plans are
business decisions not subject to ERISA fiduciary duty

172. If the Court is going to apply Mead it needs to provide the lower courts
with as much guidance as possible, by setting strong examples of when to apply
Chevron as opposed to Skidmore and vice versa. Simplicity cannot always be the
priority of the Court, but when the Court itself acknowledges that what it is
providing is not a "bright-line" test, it must be cautious not to blur the line any
more than necessary.
173. Mead, 533 U.S. 218.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 259.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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requirements. 178 There are several reasons to support the notion that
termination of a single-employer plan through the purchase of
annuities is superior to merger. 179 In Beck, these reasons are
specifically applicable. 180 It is possible to imagine a situation where
public policy might support requiring a company to consider merger
along with termination-i.e. in a situation where plan participants
could continue to work and accrue benefits in the merged plan.181
But even if it were true that on some occasions it would be in the best
of interests of the plan participants to merge the plan instead of
terminate it, requiring an employer to consider this option would be a
heavy burden. 182 Consequently, it appears the Court in Beck did
reach the best conclusion possible when considering the decision's
83
immediate impact.
While Beck's impact on ERISA fiduciary law is clear and
immediate, its impact on administrative law and judicial deference is
much less clear, although potentially much greater in scope. As
discussed for its legal significance, it appears that the Court may be
moving toward adopting Scalia's proposal to apply Chevron
deference to all authoritative agency interpretations. 184 If this is the
case, Beck will certainly impact society by setting new parameters for
judicial deference to agency interpretations, which will in turn impact
85
litigation between private entities and government agencies. 1

178. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2316.
179. See id. Many argue that plan assets are more secure in an annuity than
merged with a multi-employer plan.
180. See Beck, 127 S. Ct. 2310.
181. In Beck, Crown was in bankruptcy and all employees and plan
participants were no longer able to continue their employment with Crown. See id.
at 2314-15. Consequently, even if Crown had selected merger, it is unlikely that
the participants of the original plan could have been able to continue contributing
to the merged plan. See id. However, if Crown was continuing to employ their
plan participants, who could then contribute and enjoy the benefits of the multiemployer plan, merger might have been better for the employees than plan
termination. A merger would allow the participants to continue to accrue benefits.
182. See id. Remember that with a merger, ERISA continues to apply. With
termination, however, ERISA no longer covers the plan, and the employer no
longer is subject to ERISA's fiduciary requirements.
183. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 258.
184. See id; see also notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
185. See generally note 178 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court's opinion in Beck is notable for two
separate reasons: (1) for confirming that merger is not a termination
under ERISA meriting fiduciary consideration,1 86 and (2) for
highlighting the ambiguity surrounding the level of judicial deference
owed to an agency in interpreting that agency's own enabling statutes
and signaling a potentially considerable change in the Court's
deference jurisprudence.' 87 Most significant is the Court's shift in its
deference jurisprudence, indicating consideration (if not adoption) of
Justice Scalia's "authoritative" standard for applying Chevron as
expressed in his dissenting opinion in Mead.18 8 The next few years
will demonstrate if the Court is willing to continue on its broad
deferential path, especially when faced with cases consisting of facts
more challenging to the application of Chevron than those in Beck.

186. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2324.
187. See id.
188. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 258.

